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In this paper, we analyze the impact of short-term rental on housing prices through
a quasi-natural experiment that exploits a ban imposed in 2018 by the municipality of
Lisbon in several of its neighborhoods. We rely on administrative data on the registries
of short-term rental housing units and neighborhood housing prices and sold quantities
in Lisbon and Porto to employ i) difference-in differences models and ii) event-study
designs. Our findings document a sizeable peak in new registries during the period
between the announcement of the ban and its implementation, suggesting that agents
were able to avoid the restriction. We also show that the ban fell short on its claims and
validate the theory that buyers in the housing market value the option to participate
in the short-term rental market upon purchase.
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1 Introduction
It was not until early this century that, for the first time in history, the global urban
population outnumbered the rural population. By 2050, the ratio of world’s population
living in urban areas is expected to be at two-thirds.1 This fast-moving trend led former
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to coin this as the “Urban Millennium”, and as such, the
desire to address sustainable development from an urban perspective is reflected in the goals
set by the UN in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.2
Among others, housing affordability has become a key matter in the management of this
urban growth. However, dealing with the former has revealed to be everything but a smooth
journey, with alarms ringing all over the world.3 Focusing on Europe, many reasons have
been pointed as being in the root of this issue: from historically low borrowing costs to a
booming tourism and the emergence of peer-to-peer markets such as Airbnb.4
In theory, these factors may contribute to a speculation-induced expansion in the housing
market demand, as investors might acquire properties for potential appreciation, renting
them as a source of income during the ownership (Sheppard et al. 2016). This can be quite
relevant in this context, since metropolitan areas are usually land constrained and tend to be
more regulated (Green et al. 2005), meaning their housing supply is characterized by lower
elasticities (Saiz 2010). As a consequence, demand shocks are amplified in the absence of
adequate supply side adjustments that could smoothly accommodate the former (Hilber &
Vermeulen 2015). They also lead to a shift within the housing market supply, namely by
generating a bias towards short-term rental agreements, as the latter become relatively more
attractive to landlords, implying a reduction in the stock of properties destined to permanent
housing and the consequent arising of inflationary pressures.









One of the countries that seems to have particularly felt the effects of the increasing
tourism is Portugal. In fact, not only the number of passengers in Lisbon’s airport increased
from 13 to 29 million5 in the last decade, as the city also tops the ratio of Airbnb listings per
inhabitant across European capitals.6 Moreover, in 2014, the country opted for a regulatory
reform, Decreto-Lei n.o 128/2014, which vastly simplified the bureaucratic process for land-
lords to list their property on hosting platforms and start accepting guests, thereby allowing
the transition to short-term rental to become frictionless (Franco et al. 2019). This path
seems to have generated regrets, as in 2018 the city was taking a u-turn by imposing restric-
tions on the very same market, resulting in the creation of areas on which the registry of new
short-term rental units was suspended - Proposta n.o 677/AML/2018. We take advantage
of the latter in order to provide quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of short-term
rental marketplaces on house prices, by employing a Difference-in-Differences approach that
compares regions which were affected by the registry suspension at different periods in time.
Our findings suggest the occurrence of anticipation effects, with new short-term rental
registries increasing by 32.4% in affected areas right before they were suspended. Regarding
the housing market, the law’s approval resulted in a decrease in prices estimated at 16%
for contained zones, although this effect was less prominent after the implementation. The
number of sales decreased by 23.1% in the treated areas after the law became effective, which
is consistent with the theory that the option to short-term rent upon purchase is valued by
the buyers. However, these effects were only felt by the smaller, most “Airbnb-ish” dwellings.
The paper is organized as it follows: the next section reviews the existing literature on
the effects of home-sharing markets on housing affordability. Section 3 describes the context
and the institutional framework behind our empirical strategy. Sections 4 and 5 explain the
data and methodology. Section 6 presents the results. Finally, in section 7 we discuss our
findings and provide some concluding remarks.





Empirical evidence has uncovered many negative effects that arise from the thrive of
platforms such as Airbnb. As expected, hotel revenues significantly decrease as new and
accessible alternatives emerge. However, this impact manifests itself primarily through less
aggressive hotel room pricing (Zervas et al. 2017). This increased competitiveness in the
short-term rental market implies some resulting dividends for consumers (although concerns
may be developed on how fair that competition is and what kind of consumers benefits
from this). Edelman et al. (2017) discuss the racial discrimination involved in the process
of matching landlords and tenants in this kind of platforms. Wachsmuth & Weisler (2018)
explore the gentrification that results from the geographical imbalances of Airbnb’s revenue
flows, which enhances within-cities income inequality and increases tenant displacement.
It is critical to disentangle the consequences of this gentrification process, as these can be
potentially confounding and therefore hinder any inferences about the causal relationship
between Airbnb presence and housing prices.
Despite the existence of a considerable amount of literature in the context of sharing
economy, the empirical work on the specific relationship between the prominence of peer-to-
peer housing markets and rents is still somewhat scarce.
Among that literature, the main focus resides in the impact of Airbnb on the North Amer-
ican market. Sheppard et al. (2016) employ a matched difference-in-differences to estimate
the causal impact of Airbnb presence on New York City’s house prices and conclude that,
considering the treatment of having Airbnb units nearby, a property’s sale price increases by
3.5% for weakly treated peripheral properties and by 65% for heavily treated and/or centrally
located properties. Horn & Merante (2017) analyze data from Boston and find that a one
standard deviation increase in Airbnb density leads to a 0.4% increase in local rents. Barron
et al. (2018) use data on Airbnb’s listings between 2011 and 2016 across the United States
to employ a two-stage least squares approach by constructing an instrumental variable based
on google trends, but find modest effects.
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Koster et al. (2018) take advantage of the Los Angeles’ Home Sharing Ordinances (namely
a restriction adopted by 18 of its 88 cities that prevented landlords to short-term rent any
property besides their primary one) to apply a Panel Regression-Discontinuity Design at the
treatment borders and conclude that Ordinances reduced listings by 50% and house prices by
3%. More recently, Valentin (2019) found that the regulatory reform in New Orleans (which
required hosts to pay for an annual short-term rental license, limited the number of days
a host could rent per year and defined prohibition zones for this type of rental) displaced
landlords from short-term renting and led to a decrease in house prices.
Moreover, some empirical work has been carried out in Southern Europe. Segú (2018)
finds that Airbnb is responsible for a 4% increase in Barcelona’s rents between 2009 and 2016,
through an instrumental approach based on a listed unit’s distance to the beach. Garcia-
López et al. (2019) use an instrumental variable fixed-effects model based on neighborhood
proximity to tourist amenities to find that Airbnb presence in Barcelona between 2012 and
2016 raised rents by 7% on average in the most tourist neighborhoods. Finally, Franco et al.
(2019) took advantage of the 2014 Portuguese reform that promoted short-term housing
supply by employing a matched difference-in-differences. The authors conclude that, in
Portugal, a 1 p.p increase in the share of Airbnb properties increases house prices by 4.5%.
Our paper adds to the existing body of literature by taking advantage of a quasi-natural
experiment to use an identification strategy that better restricts the presence of endogeneity
(as explained over the following section), therefore resulting in a more robust causal inference.
3 Context & Institutional Framework
Figure 1 shows the evolution of housing prices in Lisbon and Porto, relative to the nation-
wide reality. From early 2016 to mid 2019, the median sale price per square meter for Lisbon
and Porto increased by 68.2% and 61.9%, respectively. As for the whole country, the growth
rate was more modest, sitting at 24.2%.
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The heterogeneity of this growth was not particular to the aggregate level. Looking at
Lisbon, and focusing on the time frame that preceded any sort of action to tackle the issue,
Figure 2 shows how this rise was distributed across the city. It suggests that this was not
a homogeneous process, as the highest growth rates were concentrated on central downtown
areas, whilst the low growth rates were mainly experienced by peripheral locations.






Reforms on how short-term rental is regulated have long been a topic of discussion. En
route to the 2017 Portuguese municipal elections, the incumbent socialist mayor Fernando
Medina declared his intention to enforce a larger public oversight on its supply, an ambition
which was shared by the candidates on the left side of the political spectrum.7 On the right,
despite a common apprehension, candidates expressed their desire to increase incentives for
long-term rental rather than imposing regulation as an approach to deal with the situation.8
Nevertheless, public intervention was indiligent, as it was only in August 2018, and after
a long period of contestation from the Lisbon’s civil parishes on which Airbnb presence was
sharper, that the Portuguese parliament finally decided to throw a spanner in the works by
passing a reform, Lei 62/2018, which granted Portuguese municipalities the power to regulate
new registrations of properties in the Portuguese Registry Office for Short-Term Rentals
(Registo Nacional de Estabelecimentos de Alojamento Local - RNAL).9 This decentralization
of the power to regulate the Short-Term Rental market was seen as being key to deal with
such an heterogeneous housing affordability issue.
Subsequently, in November 2018, the municipality of Lisbon passed a legislation, Pro-
posta n.o 677/AML/2018, that suspended new registrations of units belonging to certain
pre-designated areas, known as Zonas Tuŕısticas Homogéneas, if these were deemed to be
oversaturated, i.e., if their ratio of short-term rental to total properties was above 25%. This
criteria was computed with information based on the short-term rental registry and the 2011
census. The areas were delimited according to their urban layouts and types of public spaces,
and taking into account the civil parishes’ borders. In terms of their aggregation level, these






icenciamento-de-alojamento-local-na-cidade-1809305. It may be worth noticing that the request for
this registration is a sufficient and necessary condition for landlords to fill if they wish to list their property
on a hosting platform (according to Decreto-Lei n.o 128/2014 ). This process can easily be carried out, either
online or at a government office.
6
In April 2019, the city extended the suspension on the regulated areas and a new draft,
Proposta n.o 204/CM/2019, was approved and submitted for public discussion. This draft
intended to update the suspension areas according to new data on the short-term rental ratios.
The final version was published in November 2019 (DR n.o 214/2019, 1.o Suplemento).
Figure 3 summarizes the timeline that guides our analysis.
Figure 3: Analysis Timeline
Pre-Treatment: 2015 Q1 – 2017 Q2 
2017 Q3 – 2018 Q3 
2018 Q4 
2019 Q1 – 2019 Q3 









Overall, Lisbon seems to embody an almost ideal context to examine the effects of Airbnb
on housing affordability. Besides the already mentioned prevalence of tourism-related activ-
ities, Airbnb itself represents 74% of the activity among peer-to-peer housing platforms in
Lisbon, 64 p.p ahead of its closest competitor.10
In addition, issues related to the internal validity of this study does not seem to constitute
a problem, as the structure of the regulatory reform allows for the provision of a satisfying
control group. By comparing geographically close neighborhoods, we control for differences in
possibly confounding factors, namely the tax regime and the access to amenities.11 Moreover,
the treated zones had short-term rental to total property ratios of 27% and 29% (slightly
above the limit), while the zones in our baseline control group had ratios of 18% and 25% (the
latter just at the cut-off).12 Since the chosen threshold is somewhat arbitrary, and house-
owners in treated areas cannot individually control their treatment status, the argument for
selection on unobservables as a consequence of the treatment assignment should not hold.
10According to AirDNA, one of the largest databases on short-term rental analytics.
11Several recent empirical studies have focused on the impact of taxation on house prices, namely the effect
of transaction taxes [Dachis et al. (2012), Besley et al. (2014), Kopczuk and Munroe (2015), Hilber and
Lyytikäinen (2017), Slemrod et al. (2017), Best and Kleven (2018)], income taxes (Basten et al., 2017), and
property taxes [see Ross and Yinger (1999), Sirmans et al. (2008), Hilber et al. (2011), Elinder and Person
(2017, Bradley (2017)].
12For perspective, the 5th zone with the highest short-term rental intensity had a ratio of 10%.
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As (Neumark & Simpson 2015, p.23) discuss, in the context of place-based policies and
their analysis, a reliable counterfactual, in the absence of random treatment assignment,
might consist in “geographic areas that were either considered or qualified for treatment,
or even designated as treatment zones in other periods”. In this case, not long after initial
assignment, as soon as the data on the geographical concentration of short-term rental hous-
ing got updated, additional areas were treated.13 Although not intended, this lag can be
exploited in order to provide quasi-experimental estimates for the impact of the suspension.
Figure 4 gives a geographical perception of the considered comparison groups. We ob-
serve, in black, the areas for which registries were initially suspended (our treatment group).
Filled with a dot pattern lies our baseline control, which includes the areas that were sus-
pended in 2019. Two additional control groups are considered. The first one, which consists
on the area belonging to Neighbor civil parishes, adds the gray area to the baseline con-
trol. The second one further adds the two civil parishes from Porto that display the highest
short-term rental to total units ratio, which later in 2019 experienced restrictions as well.14
Figure 4: Treated Areas & Control Groups
Original Areas of Absolute Contention (2018)
Updated Areas of Absolute Contention (2019)
Neighbor Civil Parishes
13As the data that based the eligibility was updated even before the approval, it is likely that at least part of





Our paper uses two sources of data.
The first one consists on publicly available information from the National Short-Term
Rental Registry (RNAL). As of September 2019, our sample included 16972 submitted reg-
istries in Lisbon and 7274 in Porto, each containing individual details, namely its date and
address (among others, such as the number of rooms of the housing unit, the nationality of
the ownership and its status, i.e., either if it is a singular or colective entity).
The analysis of this data set, although diverging from the main topic of this paper, is
quite relevant since the law that allowed municipalities to regulate new registrations in the
Short-Term Rental market was passed in late August 2018, but only became effective two
months later. This lag could, in theory, allow landlords from targeted areas to register their
properties before the registry suspension, even if they had no intention of entering the market
in the short-run, potentially softening the (intended) effects of the law.
We also analyze an administrative data set (obtained from Confidencial Imobiliário)
that contains quarterly information about the number of house sales and their average and
quartile prices per square meter, for every neighborhood in Lisbon and Porto within an urban
rehabilitation area, between the first quarter of 2015 and the third quarter of 2019.15
By designating the neighborhood areas in a similar fashion as the one used by the mu-
nicipality of Lisbon when developing the studies that based the treatment assignment, this
data set allows us to define both the originally treated areas as well as our baseline control
group with a significant level of accuracy.
The trends in registries per street and housing prices per neighborhood are shown in
Figure 5. The blue lines separate the pre-treatment and the different post-treatment periods.
Descriptive statistics for both data sets are displayed in Table 1.
15Confidencial Imobiliário is a Portuguese databank specialized in real estate. The provided data set (SIR.RU)
results from a protocol established with the Municipalities of Lisbon and Porto. Urban rehabilitation areas
are zones in which, by law, the city is entitled to pre-emption rights. Data on prices is more restricted than
data on quantities, since that, for a sufficiently low number of transactions in a given neighborhood over a
given quarter, price information is omitted, in order to preserve anonymity.
9












































































































(d) Housing Prices: Neighbors Control Group
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Sample Characteristics
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
Treatment Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto Treatment Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
A.Registrations
Number of Streets 300 161 653 931 310 174 761 1133
Registries (per Street) 10.4 8.2 4.7 5.5 12.7 9.1 5.8 6.7
(9.9) (10.3) (6.6) (8.1) (12.9) (11.5) (7.7) (11.0)
% Singular 0.530 0.499 0.529 0.528 0.482 0.405 0.521 0.521
% National 0.961 0.964 0.965 0.970 0.940 0.953 0.950 0.950
Rooms (per Registry) 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.9
(2.0) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (1.4) (2.1) (2.0) (2.0)
% Alignment 0.519 0.484 0.441 0.399
(0.022) (0.027) (0.071) (0.073)
% Turnout 0.577 0.571 0.563 0.525
(0.013) (0.021) (0.030) (0.066)
B.Housing Prices (m2)
Number of Neighborhoods 9 18 57 60 9 18 57 60
Average Price (per Neighborhood) 2928.5 2668.7 2507.7 2496.8 4417.6 4154.0 3708.9 3688.4
(322.9) (1002.5) (709.9) (1439.3) (412.9) (1118.1) (948.2) (934.5)
% Alignment 0.523 0.488 0.474 0.411
(0.041) (0.050) (0.052) (0.065)
% Turnout 0.546 0.552 0.523 0.538
(0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.69)




Our econometric specifications were based on the following equation:
ln(Ys,p,q) = αs,p + δTreats,p + β1Treats,p ·Discussionq + β2Treats,p · Approvalq
+ β3Treats,p · Postq + γXp,q + λp + τq + εs,p,q
(1)
Where the outcome variable takes the value of (the logs of) Rs,p,q, the number of regis-
trations belonging to street s from civil parish p in quarter q, APn,p,q, the average sale price
of housing units belonging to neighborhood n from civil parish p in quarter q and Sn,p,q,
the total number of sold houses in neighborhood n from civil parish p in quarter q. The
independent variables include Treats,p as a treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the street is contained in the original absolute contention areas, Treats,p · Discussionq as
an interaction term between the treatment variable and the period between the electoral
campaign and the proposal’s approval (2017 Q3 to 2018 Q3), Treats,p ·Approvalq as an inter-
action term between the treatment variable and the period ranging from the approval of the
proposal to its implementation (2018 Q4), Treats,p · Implementq as an interaction between
the treatment variable and the periods after which the law became effective (2019 Q1 to 2019
Q3), Xp,q as time-varying civil parish specific controls, which include the abstention level and
political alignment with Lisbon’s mayor, λp and τq as civil parish and quarter fixed effects
(respectively), that account for time-invariant characteristics. εs,p,q is an error term.
Logs are used due to the right-skewness in the dependent variables’ distributions and for
interpretation purposes. The least count value is also added in the log-transformation of
Rs,p,q due to the existence of zero-values in the observations. The use of multiple interactions
is motivated by the fact that the entire process which led to the suspension of new short-term
rental units consisted on various stages that may have induced different behavioral effects.
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To account for serial correlation within the panel units, standard errors were clustered
(Bertrand et al. 2004). This was done at the most aggregate level (Civil Parish), in an
attempt “to be conservative and avoid bias” (Cameron & Miller 2015, p.17).
5.2 Event Study Plots
Event study exercises were also carried out, according to the following equation:
ln(Ys,p,q) = λp + τq +
∑
q 6=2017Q2
βq(Treats,p ·Quarterq) + εs,p,q (2)
Where the outcome variable takes the value of (the logs of) Rs,p,q and APn,p,q. The
regressor Treats,p · Quarterq is an interaction term between the treatment and the quarter
dummies. λp and τq are civil parish and quarter fixed effects, just as in equation (1). εs,p,q is
an error term. Log-transformations are carried out in a similar way as in the difference-in-
differences model. Standard errors were again clustered at the civil parish level.
The base period is the second quarter of 2017, as it is the last one that preceded the
electoral campaign for the 2017 Portuguese municipal elections, which kicked off the debate
around prospective suspension on short-term rental in specific areas of the city, therefore
enacting any possible reactions.
The conduction of these event studies is quite important as it allows us to formally test
if, prior to the discussion on restrictive regulation, the concentration of short-term rental




Looking at the results related to the registry data, Figure 6 shows that the parallel trend
hypothesis is not rejected in the pre-treatment period.16 However, during the approval period
(in orange), home owners from targeted areas which had not registered their property appear
to have rushed that procedure before the law became binding, possibly undermining its goals.














































































































































(b) ln(Rs,p,q + 1): Neighbors Control
The estimates of equation (1), which can be observed in Table 2, imply a similar inter-
pretation. Looking at the specification in column (2), which is our baseline, the coefficients
suggest that, although there was no significant reaction to the initial public discussion over
short-term rental regulation, streets on the originally treated areas experienced a short-term
increase of 32,4% in the quarterly number of registrations as a result the law’s approval.
However, this treatment effect was not homogeneous. Table 3 shows that this reaction
was much stronger for domestic house owners, relative to foreign ones. Reasons may include
increased awareness by nationals in respect to the law and the registration process, allowing
a faster reaction. Moreover, the effect was higher for owners of smaller units, so we confirm
the widespread belief that the latter are the main segment of the short-term rental market.
16The shaded area corresponds to the post-treatment period, namely to the discussion (in yellow) and the
approval (in orange).
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences - Registrations
Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ·Discussion 0.008 0.008 0.023 0.036 0.014
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Treat · Approval 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.343*** 0.385*** 0.417***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes No No
Number of Obs. 8352 8352 8352 19392 26160
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.105 0.105 0.143 0.120
Notes: Controls include Civil Parishes’ political alignment with the Mayor’s party and turnout rate.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Civil Parish level.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects - Registrations
Rooms (Median) Ownership Status Nationality
Below/= Above Singular Colective Domestic Foreign
Treat ·Discussion 0.010 -0.009 -0.007 0.016 -0.002 0.014
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Treat · Approval 0.297*** 0.126** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.309*** 0.094
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No No No No No
Number of Obs. 7824 6256 7328 7744 8320 3504
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.065 0.078 0.077 0.099 0.056
Notes: The comparison group is our baseline control.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Finally, to assess any potential spillover effects, equation (1) was estimated again, this
time with a treatment group that consisted on the streets located right outside the suspension
border. Besides possible contagion, a rationale for spillover effects may be the notion that,
after the law becomes effective, the establishment of new short-term rental units might start
to concentrate in the “second-best” locations, i.e, the allowed areas which are closer to the
suspended ones. Table 4 exhibits the results. Our baseline specification suggests the absence
of statistically significant spillovers, even after the suspension became binding, ruling out
any displacement effects. This is likely a consequence of the anticipation observed in the
treated areas, which may have simply decreased the local need for new registrations instead
of shifting them to the outside borders.
Table 4: Spillover Effects - Registrations
Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ·Discussion 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.046 0.023
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Treat · Approval -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 0.067 0.098
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Treat · Implement -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.116 -0.196*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes No No
Number of Obs. 4218 4218 4218 17480 25916
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.080 0.079 0.083 0.070
Notes: Controls include Civil Parishes’ political alignment with the Mayor’s party and turnout
rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Civil Parish level.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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6.2 Housing Prices
Focusing on the effects on house prices, the event-studies shown in Figure 7 do not appear
to reject the pre-treatment parallel trend assumption. Moreover, it is interesting to observe
how prices seem to react during the discussion period (in yellow), even before the approval.17
Comparing to Figure 6, it looks that prices had a faster response, relative to the registrations.








































































































































































(b) lnAPn,p,q: Neighbors Control
The estimated coefficients from equation (1) (which can be observed in Table 5 ) yield a
rather curious result. Although the suspension of short-term rental registrations seems to
have induced a decrease in the housing prices, this effect is higher (both in magnitude and
statistical significance) for the period between the approval of the law and its implementation.
In this case, prices decreased by 16% shortly after approval, and 7.7% after implementation
(with this last effect not being statistically significant under stricter confidence intervals).
To infer the heterogeneity in these effects, we re-estimate the difference-in-differences
model by the number of rooms and energetic efficiency. The results (in Table 6 ) are consis-
tent with the findings in Subsection 6.1, as they show that the more “Airbnb-marketable”
properties are the ones affected by the suspension, meaning that the restriction is unable to
provide a general increase in housing affordability for households that inhabit their property.
17The shaded area corresponds to the post-treatment period, namely to the discussion (in yellow), the approval
(in orange) and the implementation (in red).
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences - Housing Prices
Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ·Discussion -0.095 -0.082 -0.089 -0.039 -0.035
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Treat · Approval -0.179*** -0.160*** -0.178*** -0.132*** -0.124***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Treat · Implement -0.088** -0.077* -0.079* -0.023 -0.026
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes No No
Number of Obs. 459 459 459 1037 1078
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.647 0.544 0.631 0.626
Notes: Controls include Civil Parishes’ political alignment with the Mayor’s party and turnout rate.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Civil Parish level.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects - Housing Prices
Number of Rooms Energy Efficiency (Median)
1 Room 2 Rooms 3+ Rooms Above Below/=
Treat ·Discussion -0.077 -0.024 -0.133 0.013 -0.015
(0.15) (0.05) (0.18) (0.10) (0.07)
Treat · Approval -0.295** -0.186 0.040 -0.110 0.135
(0.10) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) (0.10)
Treat · Implement -0.063 -0.174*** -0.041 0.018 0.060
(0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No No No No
Number of Obs. 244 210 192 240 310
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.607 0.388 0.391 0.473
Notes: The comparison group is our baseline control.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
17
Finally, we test how the ban of new short-term rental registrations affected the dispersion
of the prices in the housing market. To do this, equation (1) is re-estimated, with the
quartile coefficient of dispersion as the outcome variable. This (relative) measure is computed
by dividing the difference between the third and the first quartiles by their sum. Table 9
shows the results.18 We find no significant effects in terms of housing prices’ dispersion as a
consequence of the suspension.
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences - Quartile Coefficient of Dispersion
Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ·Discussion -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.003 N/A
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Treat · Approval -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.030 N/A
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Treat · Implement -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 N/A
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes No No
Number of Obs. 180 180 180 468 N/A
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.032 0.037 0.078 N/A
Notes: Controls include Civil Parishes’ political alignment with the Mayor’s party and
turnout rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Civil Parish level.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
18Estimates considering neighborhoods in downtown Porto as part of the control group are not available due
to lack of data
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6.3 Number of Sold Houses
In the previous section, we have seen that the ban imposed by the municipality of Lisbon
led to a decrease in house prices on the treated areas. It becomes interesting to test the
mechanism behind it, as basic microeconomic theory tells us that the decrease could be
justified by either a contraction in demand (as happens if potential buyers value the possibility
of short-term renting upon purchase) or a supply expansion (which is consistent with house
owners being stranded as a result of the suspension, unable to participate in the short-term
rental market). To find out which channel predominates, we can examine the change in the
transacted quantities, since a supply-side reaction would result in a higher number of sold
houses, whereas a demand-side reaction would result in a lower number of transactions.
The evidence in Table 8 suggests that the suspension had a negative effect in the number
of sold houses, although this is only statistically significant after its implementation, with an
estimated decrease of 23.1% in the number of transactions after the law became effective.
Table 8: Difference-in-Differences - Number of Sold Houses
Baseline Control + Neighbors + Downtown Porto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat ·Discussion -0.180 -0.182 -0.183 -0.222 -0.253
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)
Treat · Approval -0.307 -0.296 -0.298 -0.464 -0.575
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.35) (0.36)
Treat · Implement -0.230** -0.231** -0.231*** -0.433*** -0.467***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes No No
Number of Obs. 509 509 509 1244 1318
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.266 0.232 0.192 0.208
Notes: Controls include Civil Parishes’ political alignment with the Mayor’s party and turnout rate.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Civil Parish level.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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This goes along with the argument that the option to participate in the short-term rental
market after a house purchase is a key determinant of the housing market demand. Moreover,
it also reflects the deficiencies in the structure of the regulatory process caused by the gap
between the announcement and the implementation, which prevented a shift within the
market supply that would increase the availability of dwellings.
In line with the analysis carried out in Subsection 6.2, we re-estimate the difference-in-
differences model by the number of rooms and energetic efficiency. The results (in Tables
9 ) are consistent with the heterogeneity found in the effects on the other variables. They
also suggest that the decrease in the number of transacted houses is mostly motivated by the
energetically efficient units.
Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects - Number of Sold Houses
Number of Rooms Energy Efficiency (Median)
1 Room 2 Rooms 3+ Rooms Above Below/=
Treat ·Discussion -0.061 -0.153** -0.157 -0.418 0.028
(0.14) (0.05) (0.09) (0.27) (0.16)
Treat · Approval 0.222 -0.235 0.207 0.226 -0.295
(0.23) (0.26) (0.13) (0.28) (0.28)
Treat · Implement -0.116 -0.384** -0.316 -0.594*** -0.118
(0.26) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civil Parish FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Controls No No No No No
Number of Obs. 458 427 449 448 490
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.186 0.039 0.238 0.178
Notes: The comparison group is our baseline control.
Significance Levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7 Final Remarks
Overall, evidence suggests that Proposta n.o 677/AML/2018 fell short on its claims.
Although housing prices appear to have been negatively affected by the law, this effect is
restricted to a specific segment of the housing market, and its magnitude may not be sufficient
to attract middle-class people to the targeted zones, meaning that, ultimately, the ban might
have failed to accomplish its goal of reducing the compositional socioeconomic asymmetry
that characterizes specific areas of the city.
The main reason for this is the fact that the suspension was impaired even before it was
implemented, by allowing considerable anticipation by the agents (as demonstrated in this
paper), who shielded themselves against the restriction, undermining its ambitions. This is
a consequence of a combination of factors, namely i) the law only limiting new registries and
ii) the entire bureaucratic process behind its implementation being slow and predictable.
In practice, this meant that, unlike the desired incentives that were induced in the demand
side (more specifically the discouragement for speculative house purchases), the intended
supply side effects (in this case a shift in its composition that would increase the available
quantity in the long-term market) were simply absent.
Moreover, our results also imply that, in areas which are affected the most by platforms
such as Airbnb, the expectation of future capital gains are a relevant factor behind the
demand for housing units. This can constitute a problem in the context of an urban society
which thrives for a sustainable socioeconomic development, as its dynamics may be severely
affected by the gentrification that may arise from this process.
Therefore, the findings from this paper, irregardless of causing some apprehension regard-
ing the used instrument, do point to the idea that there is scope for intervention.
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